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Ecosystem Management in Question:
A Reply to Ruhl
BRUCE PARDY*
I. INTRODUCTION
In Changing Nature: The Myth of the Inevitability of Ecosys-
tem Management,1 I challenge the widely held view that ecosys-
tem management (EM) is the only environmental strategy now
possible. "Ecosystem management may in some circumstances be
the best of the policy options to deal with a particular environmen-
tal problem, but to describe it as the only choice available is not
accurate,"2 the article reads, "[i]f ecosystem management does be-
come inevitable, it will not be because of nonequilibrium or the
absence of pristine systems, but because ecosystem management
itself has altered systems past the point of no return."3
In The Myth of What Is Inevitable Under Ecosystem Manage-
ment: A Response to Pardy,4 Professor J.B. Ruhl objects to my ob-
jections and reasserts EM's status as the only legitimate
environmental strategy, concluding, "I am afraid, Professor Pardy,
that Ecosystem Management is simply inevitable any way you
look at it." 5
* Associate Professor, Faculty of Law, Queen's University, Kingston, Canada.
Comments are welcome at bruce.pardy@queensu.ca.
1. Bruce Pardy, Changing Nature: The Myth of the Inevitability of Ecosystem
Management (Changing Nature), 20 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 675 (2003).
2. Id. at 691.
3. Id. at 692.
4. J.B. Ruhl, The Myth of What Is Inevitable Under Ecosystem Management: A
Response to Pardy (Response), 21 PACE ENvTL. L. REV. 315 (2004).
5. Id. at 323. It should be pointed out that in Changing Nature I have attempted
to do what Professor Ruhl says cannot, or should not, be done:
The power of the ecosystem management idea, like ideas such as sustain-
able development and environmental justice, is that it offers only a binary
policy choice and one of those choices is clearly incorrect. These norma-
tive expressions leave very little "yes, but" room. The term itself shapes
the debate, so that it becomes a question of how much more ecosystem
management (or sustainable development, or environmental justice) to
have, not whether there should be any, or whether there is some alterna-
tive . . . . [n]o politically aware person wishing to rein in the spread and
implementation of ecosystem management will do so by openly opposing
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II. REPLY
I welcome Professor Ruhi's response because it illuminates
the heart of the matter that my article addressed. First, let me
identify points on which Professor Ruhl and I appear to agree. In
no particular order, we agree (1) that environmental protection in
its broad sense is important and should be ecosystem-based; (2)
that ecosystem mismanagement is undesirable; (3) that govern-
ment has a role in environmental protection; and (4) that he and
other advocates of EM believe that EM is inevitable.
We differ on the following matters: (a) whether the arguments
addressed in Changing Nature reflect the rationales for the con-
clusion that EM is inevitable; (b) the meaning of "management";
(c) the meaning of "nature"; and (d) whether EM allows utilitarian
decisions. I will address each of these in turn.
A. Rationales for the Conclusion That EM Is Inevitable
In Changing Nature, I offer five arguments as the basis for
the conclusion that EM is inevitable, and then proceed to criticize
them. In his Response, Ruhl approves of the dismissal of these
five arguments, 6 but maintains that "none of the series of argu-
ments is an argument anyone representing Ecosystem Manage-
ment would make."7 Indeed, in setting out these arguments, Ruhl
suggests that I "dramatically misrepresented Ecosystem Manage-
ment and the work of scholars, researchers, and resource manag-
ers who support it."8 It is true that no advocate of EM of whom I
am aware has expressly articulated the reasons for the inevitabil-
ity of EM in quite these terms. But that was not my claim. In-
stead, the purpose of the arguments presented in Changing
Nature was to reflect the unexpressed, unarticulated rationales
for the conclusion that there is no policy choice now available
other than reliance upon EM; and they do, I maintain, just that.
the idea of ecosystem management, for that would be tantamount to pro-
posing ecosystem mismanagement.
J.B. Ruhl, Ecosystem Management, the ESA, and the Seven Degrees of Relevance, 14
NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T 156, 157 (2000).
The purpose of Changing Nature was to do exactly that-i.e., to oppose the idea of
ecosystem management while also opposing ecosystem mismanagement and decline.
For an alternative to both, see my article, In Search of the Holy Grail of Environmen-
tal Law: A Rule to Solve the Problem (Holy Grail), 1 INT'L J. OF SUSTAINABLE DEV. L. &
POL'Y 29 (2005).
6. Ruhl, supra note 4, at 317.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 318.
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The belief in the inevitability of EM has become so well estab-
lished as to be considered self-evident, a status which apparently
does not require arguments or reasons. 9 Advocates of EM are
often adamant about the pre-eminence of their approach, but it is
not easy to find the logical basis for their faith. In his Response,
Ruhl is clear that he believes EM to be inevitable, but even he is
pretty sketchy about why.
In Changing Nature, one of the five arguments I describe as a
basis for the conclusion that EM is inevitable is that ecosystems
are thought to be past the point of no return. 10 The argument is
set out as follows:
There are no pristine systems left. (This statement is correct.)
Therefore, humans have changed all ecosystems. (This statement
is correct.)
Therefore, there are no fully natural ecosystems left. (This state-
ment is correct.)
Therefore, there is no nature left to preserve. (This statement is
not correct and does not follow logically.)"
Professor Ruhl emphatically rejects this reasoning as a basis
for the inevitability of EM, and agrees that the proposition that
there is no nature left to preserve is wrong. 12 Yet, the reasons he
provides for the inevitability of EM in his Response consist of the
following:
The reality is that there simply is no way to "preserve" nature
without in some sense managing it somewhere with some
human-defined purpose .... If we were to make "preservation"
of an estuary our overriding purpose, we would have to manage
upstream watershed and distant air shed locations in some way.
Assuming those locations are in ecosystems too, well, then we
would be managing those ecosystems in order to preserve other
ecosystems. Also assuming we do not intend to drive humans
completely out of all ecosystems, we would necessarily be con-
fronted with the need to manage some ecosystems in order to
preserve other ecosystems .... The problem is that very few
ecosystems are immune to the effects of humans .... It would
9. Indeed, Professor Ruhl's response gives credence to my suggestion at the be-
ginning of Changing Nature that to ask whether nature should be preserved may no
longer be treated as a legitimate question. See Pardy, supra note 1, at 675.
10. Pardy, supra note 1, at 690.
11. Id.
12. Ruhl, supra note 4, at 318.
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be nice if we did not need Ecosystem Management. The dream
of letting nature alone is quite appealing. But it is too late.13
Despite his dismissal of the "past the point of no return" argu-
ment, Ruhl's underlying rationale seems to be a variation of it.
His reasoning appears to be something like this:
There are no pristine systems left. (This statement is correct.)
Therefore, humans have changed all ecosystems. (This statement
is correct.)
Therefore, there are no fully natural ecosystems left. (This state-
ment is correct.)
Therefore, it is not possible to preserve the natural character-
istics that remain because it is too late and there are no tools
other than EM. (This statement is not correct and does not follow
logically.)
The leap to the conclusion is murky indeed. Of course, resort
to EM is easy if it is defined broadly to include the use of rules,
laws, or intervention of any kind, which leads to the second point
of contention, the definition of "management."
B. The Meaning of "Management"
If one defines "management" to mean any kind of law or gov-
ernment intervention, then of course management is inevitable.
But that is far too broad a definition. EM is a particular kind of
process in which decision-makers have broad discretion to weigh
conflicting priorities to craft appropriate results one situation at a
time to fit specific facts about the system under consideration. It
is not based upon general rules, as in a statute, but is instead in-
determinate and ad hoc. EM is anathema to a rule- or precedent-
based system of law. 14 Therefore, management is not simply the
application of any kind of rules, laws, or prohibitions, but is a par-
ticular kind of decision-making process. 15
13. Id. at 321-22.
14. Ruhl himself has described environmental pragmatism, a school of thought
that embraces ecosystem management, in this way. See J.B. Ruhl, Working Both
(Positivist) Ends Toward a New (Pragmatist) Middle in Environmental Law, 68 GEo.
WASH. L. REV. 522, 531 (2000) (book review). Ruhl has written that ecosystem man-
agement is "as slippery as it needs to be to win the day." J.B. Ruhl, A Manifesto for
the Radical Middle, 38 IDAHo L. REV. 385, 394 (2002).
15. Since EM is ad hoc, rather than rule- or precedent-based, one might even say
that management and law are mutually exclusive, because the former lacks those
features that characterize systems based upon the rule of law.
212 [Vol. 23
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Therefore, it is incorrect to equate management with environ-
mental governance writ large. Unfortunately, this is what Ruhl
does in his Response. He appears to equate "management" with
any use of rules or directives in the environmental sphere.16 In
order to ridicule the possibility of leaving ecosystems alone to run
their courses as dynamic, naturally changing systems, he states
that such an objective would require intervention (which is cor-
rect); and, therefore, would require ecosystem management 17
(which is not correct). As I explain in Changing Nature, to ques-
tion EM does not question the use of rules or other legal instru-
ments to achieve environmental objectives.' 8 There are other,
better choices than the broadly discretionary, ad hoc process that
characterizes EM.' 9
C. The Meaning of "Nature"
One of the flaws in modern environmental governance is that
it is highly discretionary. Environmental decisions are often
made on the basis of whether the effects of any particular activity
or development will be "good" or "bad." The problem is that "good"
and "bad" only have meaning in human terms, and are usually
evaluated only with the short-, or possibly medium-term,
timeframe in mind. In other words, "good" and "bad" have no
meaning in purely ecological terms. A forest does not care
whether it is a forest or a glade. Only humans care whether a
pasture turns into a desert. Wetlands are only "good" from a par-
ticular human point of view; in ecological terms, a wetland has
evolved from something, and will evolve into something else.
Ecology is the science of systems, not a system of values.
When the "good" and "bad" dichotomy is allowed to have a
major role in environmental law, it results in a system of discre-
tionary judgment calls. Unfortunately, once the door of discre-
tionary decision-making has opened, everything is up for grabs-
16. Indeed, Ruhl broadens the definition further by suggesting that management
includes "[t]he very act of defining an ecosystem." Ruhl, supra note 4, at 323. If that
is so, then, of course, any inquiry into the state of ecosystems is management and
ecosystem management is inevitable; but that is as meaningless as saying that every-
thing that humans do is natural. It strips the term of usefulness and makes the con-
versation pointless.
17. Ruhl, supra note 4, at 322.
18. Pardy, supra note 1, at 677.
19. Lest Professor Ruhl be dubious about this possibility, I invite him to consider
Holy Grail, supra note 5, in which I describe an approach to environmental protection
based upon generally applicable, abstract rules and precedent-based adjudication.
2005-20061 213
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any particular decision can be justified by social, economic, politi-
cal, cultural, or aesthetic benefits if they are thought to outweigh
the permanent effects caused to ecosystem function (allowing al-
teration of an ecosystem because, for example, the economic bene-
fits will "improve the overall human environment," or some such
other doublespeak). When all such decisions are added together,
the overall result is cumulative ecosystem degradation. The
solution is to do away with "good" and "bad" and substitute an
alternative dichotomy: natural and unnatural. That would pre-
vent decision-makers from allowing human-caused ecosystem
change.20
In order for a shift to natural/unnatural to be accomplished, a
workable definition of "natural" is necessary. In his Response,
Ruhl suggests that the only definition of "natural" I offer in
Changing Nature is that "'ecosystems continue to change through
time even when they are free from human influence."' 2 1 Far from
relying on such a vague statement, I articulate a meaning for
"natural" based upon the economic analogy of a perfectly competi-
tive marketplace. 22 No doubt the enterprise of defining the line
between "natural" and "unnatural" is difficult, but it is possible to
be more concrete and substantive than the discretionary and polit-
ically laden judgment calls between "desirable" and "undesirable"
that occur within EM. 23
D. The Utilitarianism of Ecosystem Management
Professor Ruhl and I may share a vision about what the
world, ecologically speaking, should be like. Ruhl quotes with ap-
proval Edward Grumbine's description of five principal goals of
EM: maintaining viable populations of all native species in situ;
representing, within protected areas, all native ecosystem types
across their natural range of variation; maintaining evolutionary
and ecological processes; maintaining the evolutionary potential of
20. Of course, every rule has exceptions. The challenge in providing the excep-
tions is to allow the ability to carry out actions, for example, that are necessary for
short-term human survival in an emergency situation. What the exceptions should
not do is submit the whole enterprise to the discretion of political officials, who can be
counted on to shift the test away from purely ecological considerations and towards
short-term economic and social considerations, which is what has produced ecosystem
problems in the first place.
21. Ruhl, supra note 4, at 319.
22. Pardy, supra note 1, at 683-85.
23. For a detailed attempt to define a bright-line rule for ecosystem protection, see
Holy Grail, supra note 5.
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species and ecosystems; and accommodating human use and occu-
pancy within these constraints. 24 The system of environmental
governance that I advocate might well produce such results.
But if I agree with Ruhl and Grumbine about objectives, then
what is the problem? Within EM, which is not rule-driven but
based upon broad discretion and ad hoc, fact-specific decision-
making, no one is in a position to define goals because no one is in
a position to enforce them. Each individual decision-maker is able
to develop an individual view about priorities; and those priorities
often consist of placing short- and medium-term economic, social,
political, cultural, and aesthetic considerations ahead of ecosys-
tem function. To see that this is so, compare the description of
goals from Grumbine above with the quote from Daniel Botkin re-
ferred to in Changing Nature. Botkin states:
The task before us is to understand the biological world to the
point that we can learn how to live within the discordant harmo-
nies of our biological surroundings, so that they function not
only to promote the continuation of life but also to benefit our-
selves: our aesthetics, morality, philosophies, and material
needs. 25
The point is not that Botkin or Grumbine is right and the
other wrong, but simply that these two prominent advocates of
EM state priorities that are different. Grumbine's goals are
ecosystem-oriented; Botkin's mandate encompasses utilitarian
purposes-human needs, wants, and inclinations. At a minimum,
EM makes a utilitarian approach possible. Indeed, Ruhl himself
must recognize the utilitarian balancing act that EM performs
when he acknowledges, "debate remains strong in discrete set-
tings over how much to emphasize maintenance of native ecosys-
tems versus accommodation of human use and occupancy .... 26
In other words, sometimes the greatest good for the greatest num-
ber will be realized by putting the needs of modern human society
ahead of the maintenance of native ecosystems. That is utilita-
rian reasoning. Ruhl may believe, like Grumbine, that one of the
most important goals for EM is to preserve native ecosystems-
but that is not what a system of EM requires. As I state in Chang-
24. Ruhl, supra note 4, at 316 n.5 (citing R. Edward Grumbine, What Is Ecosystem
Management?, 8 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 27, 31 (1994)).
25. Pardy, supra note 1, at 676 (quoting DANIEL BOTKIN, DISCORDANT HARMONIES:
A NEW ECOLOGY FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 191 (1990)).
26. Ruhl, supra note 4, at 316.
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ing Nature, EM provides the legal mandate "to measure, control
and change ecosystems to produce the most desirable environ-
ment in human terms. Sometimes this means preserving particu-
lar ecosystems, but more often it does not."27 Ruhl may not want
EM to be utilitarian, but for a decision-maker with utilitarian
objectives, EM is the ideal tool. Ruhl agrees that natural re-
sources policy should not be directed at changing ecosystems to
suit human preferences, but unfortunately he favors a process
that, because of its discretionary nature, allows exactly that.
It is not possible to know what priority or emphasis any par-
ticular decision-maker doing EM will bring to the task precisely
for the reason that EM is not governed by general rules. On a
particular occasion, that decision-maker may indeed agree with
Ruhl (and me) about the desirability of protecting native ecosys-
tems, or alternatively may believe that priority should be given to
meeting human values and aesthetic needs. EM is a process, not
a substantive set of directives. Therefore, Grumbine is not in a
position to declare its goals. And, because it is merely a process,
EM is subject to the political, economic, and social winds of the
time and place in which any particular decision occurs. Such
winds usually favor business as usual: not ecosystems as they are,
but human activities as they are, which, in the modern era, gener-
ally have the effect of cumulatively changing ecosystems.
III. CONCLUSION: ECOSYSTEM MANAGEMENT IN
QUESTION
The discretionary nature of EM means that it is not possible
to direct that priority be given to any particular interest, ecologi-
cal or human; and thus it is inevitable that EM will lead to utilita-
rian decisions based upon "balancing" of interests, and thus to
incremental ecosystem change. In other words, EM is a rear-
guard action whose prevailing function is to minimize the rate of
ecological decline while facilitating business as usual as much as
possible. Many advocates of EM do not intend such a result (their
priority is environmental protection), but they are not in a posi-
tion to control the results of discretionary and, therefore, ulti-
mately political, decision-making. They cannot prevent the
27. Pardy, supra note 1, at 675. Lest there be any doubt whether it is acceptable
to control and change ecosystems within Daniel Botkin's management paradigm, he
also states, "From the new perspective, nature does not provide simple answers. Peo-
ple are forced to choose the kind of environment they want, and a 'desirable' environ-
ment may be one that people have altered. . . ." BOTKIN, supra note 25, at 189.
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process from being influenced by interests-local, industrial, pro-
fessional, or political-that do not share their ideas of what a
proper outcome should be.
EM is a choice. There are other choices, too. Those who advo-
cate EM should be expected to justify, coherently and persua-
sively, why it is the best of the choices-why it is necessary to
place environmental futures in the hands of a professional elite
empowered to shape conditions one ecosystem at a time as it sees
fit according to its own technical or political judgment. Environ-
mental managers are not even subject to the same systemic limi-
tations as judges, because EM's main premise is that every
decision is unique and, therefore, there is no room for the notion of
precedent, and no such thing as a general rule. EM prevents envi-
ronmental law from becoming a coherent, predictable discipline.
The most effective excuse for arbitrary environmental decisions is
to maintain at the outset that each case must be based on its own
particular circumstances. In other words, the best way to acquire
undemocratic control over environmental conditions is to insist
that EM is inevitable.
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